As early as Robert Marett's 1902 essay "Origin and Validity in Ethics," he announced that ethics was one amongst several "organised interests" of the human spirit that move people to action and he went on to note that feeling was central to its ability to accomplish this task, since "thought unsupported by feeling is powerless to found a habit of will" (p. 233; 240) . A consultation of Marett's (1932) later book Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion confirms that he had not abandoned this idea by the time of his 1931-2 Gifford Lectures, and he was then even inclined to see religion as most importantly a source of feeling, and at least primitive religion as a source of those feelings that turn moral thoughts into spurs to action. Something like these issues that preoccupied Marett make a late appearance in my own attempt to relate ethics and religion in what follows, though admittedly the key lines of debate and the theoretical tools I will want to bring to bear on them are so different from Marett's own as to be nearly unrecognizable from within his own framework. It seems clear, we might say, that from his time to ours everything has changed. Everything except, that is, the most important questions, which still have a familiar ring. So while I will start elsewhere than a close reading of Marett's work, and I will end up somewhere other than he did, I hope the echoes of his concerns are audible nonetheless.
Having already signaled a rapid shift to a more current idiom, let me turn immediately to noting that the very rapid growth of interest in the study of ethics has been one of the most notable recent developments in anthropology. From a marginal or at best background concern at the end of the last century, the anthropology of ethics has come to approach the status of something like a key trend in the contemporary discipline.
With the ambition to lead a major reassessment of many core aspects of social theorymost notably those that hover around the nature of human action -and the promise to do so while opening up new horizons for ethnographic work by helping us attend to kinds of data we once ignored, the study of ethics has quickly achieved its lofty position by generating interest quite broadly throughout anthropology. Indeed, cross-cutting subdisciplines and regional concerns, ethics is one of the few topics that is even a candidate to provide some unity to an increasingly fragmented field in which specialists more and more frequently struggle to find interest in work produced beyond their regional, topical, and theoretical borders. Having made its way to the main stage of our sprawling discipline, the study of ethics is set to make a significant mark on how anthropology is practiced for the foreseeable future.
There are surely many reasons the anthropology of ethics has taken off so quickly in the last several years, many of them related to the fact that looking back it is easy to see that it was absurd that it took so long to develop. It seems obvious now, in ways it did not even fifteen years ago, that to have a human science that ignores the role of ethics in personal and social life has to be a mistake. So the anthropology of ethics points to and then fills an important, almost embarrassing, gap in disciplinary thought, and the relatively straightforward claim that it does so has to be part of any story of its recent success. But along with that explanation, I would like to suggest that another reason the anthropology of ethics has generated excitement so widely in the discipline is that it has spent a lot of time at the frontier stage, in which there is as yet no normal science to stifle creativity and experiment, and in which the arrival of virtually every new journal issue holds out the promise of some novel approach to the topic worth looking into (Robbins 2012a) . Those with an interest in Aristotle, or ordinary language philosophy, or the anthropological linguistic study of interaction, or phenomenology, or however we want to classify Foucault, or even the classical social theory of Durkheim and Weber all make contributions, and they can do so while studying all manner of topics, from state level politics to kinship, from gift giving to lying, from sickness to healing, and from religious piety to cutting edge business practices. To this point, the anthropology of ethics has pitched a broad tent, and it is surely in part its habit of welcoming all comers that has allowed it to do so in the discipline's center ring.
Using an older terminology indebted to Thomas Kuhn (1996) , we can call the welcoming quality of the anthropology of ethics that I have just described a preparadigmatic openness. I have mentioned it, and its likely role in the explosive growth of the field, because I have a sense that the era marked by this radical openness might soon draw to a close. In the last few years, more and more people who contribute to the anthropological study of ethics have come to define what they study as "ordinary" or "everyday" ethics. Ever since 2010, when Michael Lambek edited a landmark volume with the title "Ordinary Ethics," one sees that phrase and its near cognate "everyday ethics" with increasing frequency in the literature. They have become terms to conjure with, and this has been an important development, bringing some momentum toward theoretical progress to the anthropology of ethics to complement the widely creative but in no sense cumulative tendencies that have marked its frontier phase, and equally notably generating real critical debate where there had once been mostly parallel play (e.g. Clarke 2014 , Lempert 2013 , Parkin n.d., Zigon 2014 . To again draw on broadly Kuhnian terms, the rise of everyday ethics signals, I think, that an intellectual maturation of the anthropology of ethics is afoot -it marks the advent of what Morgan Clarke (2014: 419) calls '"discrete disciplinary pressures" as to what one's proper subjects ought to be' when one turns to the study of ethics -and it seems likely that to whatever extent the anthropology of ethics does develop toward a state of normal science, it will be one that itself highlights the social equivalent of such normalcy as it unfolds under the sign of ordinary or everyday life.
The increasing focus on the ordinary and the everyday, and the normalizing sense of disciplinary momentum it has brought to the anthropology of ethics, are all to the good, and I hope that nothing in my forgoing narration of its ascent to prominence suggests otherwise. But of course every vantage point has its blind spots, and in what follows I want to take up one of the potential limits of the view from the ordinary and the everyday.
The potential blind spot I am worried about is one that obscures the contribution of religion, or of the transcendent, to ethics. Religion is not necessarily the opposite of the ordinary and everyday, but as an exercise it is worth considering such standard antonyms to these terms as "extraordinary," "exceptional," and "unusual" and noting that these terms all apply to the sacred and to religion more generally. Understood as it often is in these terms, the sacred seems a notion that does not effortlessly inhabit the world of the ordinary and the everyday.
I recognize that these quick semantic observations invite all kinds of quibbling, but I make them by way of introducing a more empirically grounded point, which is that up until now, religion really has not been central to the theorization of everyday, ordinary ethics. Thus Lambek's and Veena Das's influential, founding theoretical statements of the ordinary ethics position do not draw on theories of religion, even as they do sometimes take up Austin-inspired accounts of ritual performativity as an aspect of everyday linguistic interaction.
1 And James Laidlaw's (2014) path breaking book-length construction of the field, which while not framed as a work of ordinary ethics per se is in sustained and careful dialogue with this development, likewise does not draw much on theory of religion in laying out its approach. There is an irony here, of course, in that
Lambek is one of the leading anthropological scholars of religion at work today, and Laidlaw, along with many others who contribute to the ordinary ethics discussion would also, in their other work, count as important contributors to this field. All of them are comfortable handling religious materials, which, for example, make up the majority of the examples in Laidlaw's book. But, I want to suggest, considerations of the nature of religion as a phenomenon, as opposed to empirical data on religious life, have not so far figured much in their construction of anthropological theories of ethics. My ultimate aim in this article is to ask what difference it would make were they to do so.
The Ordinary and the Religious
Though most of us probably have a strong sense that we know everyday life when we see it, the ordinary and the everyday can be somewhat elusive notions when one approaches them with definitional intent (Sayeau 2013: 8) . And in a critical mood one might want to note that they also have a history, and mostly a modern one, and so as concepts they are not always as innocent or uncomplicated as they sometimes appear to be. For present purposes, however, it is enough simply to indicate how those who promote the study of everyday or ordinary ethics reflect on their own use of these terms. were reduced to the study only of its ordinary, everyday forms, and in fact maybe the everyday itself does not make sense without some attention to the religious as well.
I am going to develop my argument in two steps. In the first, I want to present an understanding of religion as at least in part a matter of the transcendent, and more importantly to offer an image of the transcendent that is not as scary -neither as metaphysically alienating nor as demanding -as it often appears to be from an ordinary ethics point of view. Then, in the second, I want to look at one form of transcendent religious representation -the representations of values produced by ritual -to begin to sketch a picture of how religion informs ethical life in ways that do not explain away or traduce its everyday qualities, but that at the same time do not leave them to stand wholly on their own.
On the Transcendent
Our English word "transcendence" is derived from Latin terms that mean "to surpass" or "to go beyond" (Van Harvey 1964: 242) . Merriam Webster online suggests that current usage stays close to these roots, offering as the first two glosses: "exceeding usual limits : surpassing" and "extending or lying beyond the limits of ordinary experience." The sense in which the transcendent is defined in opposition to the everyday is evident here. It is, however, worth pausing over what we want to mean by "exceeding" and "surpassing." In some sense, I think these can be taken as simply descriptive terms, pointing to a slightly less freighted notion of being "beyond" the ordinary than we might be tempted to imagine. But they also carry with them some sense of the elevated, the excessive, or the magisterial that ordinary ethicists point to when painting the transcendent as awe-inspiring and commanding in ways that block the desirable flow of the everyday. It is this sense of the imposing quality of the transcendent that I want to dial back here, though not mute entirely. Put more positively, I want to foreground a kinder, gentler side of the transcendent that we might take to enrich rather than destroy the everyday, even as it does not collapse into it.
But before I turn to illuminating the friendlier face of the transcendent, let me pause briefly to note that I am happy to identify religion with the transcendent more generally. I do not want to dwell on this point, which would immediately detain us in the deep waters that churn around the very cross-cultural validity of the concept of religion, but mostly just to accept it for the purposes of the argument I making. Durkheim's minimal definition of religion as pertaining to sacred matters that are beyond and sharply separated from profane ones paints the religious as transcendent in relation to the everyday in a straightforward way I am happy to accept here. Csordas' (2004) identification of religion with alterity, to take a more recent example, points in broadly similar directions. Even as I find intriguing the suggestion made by proponents of axial age theories that some religions stress or greatly extend the distance of the sacred from the profane, such that we might differentiate religions from one another on the basis of the varying degrees of transcendence upon which they insist, I will from here on out work with the assumption that all social phenomena we might want to call religions are built around at least some notion of transcendence (Robbins 2009). Taking this point as given from here on out, the question I want to ask is how we might best think of the transcendent realm of religion when our primary goal is to contribute to the anthropological study of ethics. Should we see it primarily as a realm from which issue fearsome divine commands or distressing encouragements to leave behind the worldly concerns of the everyday altogether, or might we see it as having a different kind of contribution to make to ethical life?
A good starting point for reconsidering the nature of the transcendent is the work Alfred Schutz, the well known social philosopher with strong connections to both Husserl and Weber. It is Schutz's phenomenological side that most interests us here, for it leads him to argue that transcendence is inescapable in human life -for there are always things that are important to us that are outside our immediate perceptual experience but that we can represent to ourselves by means of various kinds of signs. Based on the different ways in which the things we represent to ourselves are beyond immediate experience, Schutz lays out three categories of transcendence -the "little," "medium" and "great"
transcendencies (Schutz and Luckmann 1989:105 (Bloch 2008 (Bloch : 2056 . By contrast, the transcendental social is made up of "essentialized roles and groups" of the kind social anthropologists have long taken as the prime constituents of social structure (2008: 2056) . People see these roles as more or less immutable and fixed. Individual occupants of idealized roles may leave them for various reasons, including role failure and death, but the roles and groups will continue to exist. It is for this reason that social structure in general appears to people to have a "permanence which negates the fluidity of life" and therefore transcends it (Bloch 2012: 114) . For Bloch, then, the transcendence of the transcendental social has to do in part with being impervious to the flux of the everyday as constituted by the transactional social. But
Bloch also explains such transcendence in terms that come much closer to those of Schutz, for he too stresses that people cannot perceive roles and groups directly. Instead, they must be products of the imagination that become socially shared and are therefore represented to experience, rather than given to it directly.
Like Schutz, Bloch does not completely separate the transcendental from the transactional, even as he continues to preserve its distinctiveness. As he puts it, there "is plenty of transactional social in human sociality that occurs side by side or in combination with the transcendental social", and people may "use the existence of the transcendental social as one of the many counters used in the transactional game" (2008: 2056) . To illustrate this point, and his argument more generally, Bloch discusses a Malagasy village elder he has known for many years. By the time Bloch writes his essay, this elder has become very old, somewhat senile and physically weak. He spends most days curled up in a blanket. Yet people continue to approach him with respect, deference and fear, and in ritual contexts they always put him in charge so that he can bless the participants. At the same time, however, people no longer involve this man in the transactional contexts in which they play the "Machiavellian game of influence," and in this respect they are happy to leave him out of the flow of "everyday" transactional social life (2008:2056) . He has lost most of his transactional footing, and more and more is treated by those around him only in his transcendent role -a last step toward finally achieving an ancestral existence even more fully beyond the transactional world. The ritual upon which Turner focuses in his article is the Nkang'a, the "girl's puberty ritual" of the Ndembu of northwestern Zambia (1967: 20) . Like all Ndembu rituals, Nkang'a has a dominant, or what the Ndembu call a "senior," symbol (20).
Dominant symbols in Ndembu ritual are usually trees, and for Nkang'a the tree in question is the mudyi tree, at the base of which the novice lies, wrapped in a blanket.
When the light bark of this tree is scratched, it exudes a milky white latex, and the Ndembu regard this as its key characteristic, leading turner to refer to it as the "milk tree"
(20). The matrilineal Ndembu build on this feature of the tree to interpret it as symbolizing breast milk, breasts more generally, bonds between mothers and children, matriliny, tribal custom and finally, "at its highest level of abstraction…the unity and continuity of Ndembu society" (21). When Turner asked Ndembu to tell him what the tree and the rite in which it plays a central role mean, these were the answers they gave him.
Focused as they are on social structural categories from the family to the matrilineal clan and ultimately Ndembu society as a whole, Ndembu discussions of the "who observe one set of norms find that they may transgress equally rules belonging to another set" (1968: 10-11). Turner's genius shows in his recognition that even as Ndembu people, when they tell him about Nkang'a, mention only the core values of various kinds of corporate unity that it upholds through the symbolism of the milk tree, by ritual design they practice the rite in ways that give expression to many of the tensions that compromise the realization of these values in daily life. For example, as women dance around the tree and the novice lying at its base, they dramatize opposition to men by taunting them and preventing them from joining most parts of the dance (23). In being enacted for a single novice, the rite also opposes her to other girls, and to the group of adult women she is about to join, who are represented during the rite as making her suffer (23). So too, the novice's mother is opposed to the group of adult women, who prevent her from dancing around the tree. This, Turner notes, represents "the conflict between the matricentric family and the wider society…articulated by matriliny" (24).
And in Turner's essay, the list of enacted conflicts goes on (24-25). In practice, the ritual exhibits in clear form the kinds of everyday value conflicts that beset ordinary Ndembu life.
As Turner interprets this fact, it does not invalidate the statements Ndembu routinely make that the tree and the ritual that takes place around it express the values of various kinds of group solidarity. Rather, he proffers, the values are central to the rite and the enacted conflicts only serve to stress their importance. This is so because in rituals such as Nkang'a the "raw energies of conflict are domesticated into the service of social order" (39). Now, this is a common Manchester School kind of claim, and I am not sure precisely how Turner argues for it here (it does not, for example, in any way follow directly from his argument about the polar qualities of symbols, upon which he based his claim that ritual makes values desirable). But I think he is on to something nonetheless. I would argue that the ritual has this effect precisely by suggesting that the dominant symbol does not itself represent the conflicts enacted around it, but rather actively overcomes them in the process of rendering clear expressions of "norms and values in their abstract purity" (38). It is as if ritual dramatizes in its unfolding the transcendental imperviousness of values to the evanescent, changeable, sometimes conflicted qualities of the everyday to which Bloch drew our attention. It does so by first giving vivid expression to everyday value conflicts, but then, in the course of its progression, "demonstrating" that it is possible to realize a single value or, as Turner puts it, "closely, and on the whole harmoniously, interrelated" values, on their own, in something approaching their transcendental form (40).
I can perhaps make this last point more clearly by turning briefly to an example of a ritual drawn from my own fieldwork among the Urapmin of the West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. During the period of my fieldwork in the early 1990s, the Urapmin were relatively recent converts to a charismatic form of Christianity. By the time I arrived in Urapmin, everyone in the community had converted and Christianity was at the center of much of people's public and private lives. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, in Urapmin Christian morality has come into conflict with a tradition of Urapmin moral thinking in which aggressive, self-interested behavior they call "willful" is valued to some extent, provided it is balanced by what they define as "lawful" behavior oriented toward the legitimate expectations and demands of others. Even after conversion, the conduct of much of Urapmin social life continues to demand both willful and lawful behavior. This demand is rendered problematic, however, by the fact that
Urapmin Christian morality defines all willful feelings and actions as sinful, and it enjoins people only to experience and act on lawful thoughts and feelings if they want to be saved. The goal of Urapmin Christians is therefore to cultivate an "easy" or "quiet" heart filled with "good thinking" that will lead them to live a lawful "Christian life" (Robbins 2004) .
Given that traditional and Christian morality conflict in Urapmin, and that people there still need to rely on traditional patterns of moral action in key stretches of everyday life, their lives are marked by a conflict between the values of willfulness and lawfulness.
Everyday life, in particular, rarely provides a setting in which Urapmin feel they have resolved this conflict, and this leads them to define themselves as deeply sinful people.
But in their Christian rituals, they regularly do endeavor to create images of uncompromised lawfulness and to perform such lawfulness for themselves. To illustrate this point, I want to consider just one of their Christian rituals, the Sunday morning church service.
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Urapmin attend church services quite frequently, sometimes even twice daily. Of all services, however, those on Sunday morning are the most well attended and are treated as important community-wide events. For this reason, I will focus on the Sunday morning service, though my analysis of the way the service aims to realize the value of lawfulness would fit other services as well.
As with the Ndembu Nkanga rite, the Urapmin Sunday service, even as it aims at realizing the value of lawfulness, also allows for, and gives ritual expression to, the value of willfulness. It cannot escape doing this, I will suggest, because its overall temporal structure is constructed so as to enact the lawful overcoming of the will, so it must display willfulness in its very design. We can see this theme at work even in the way Urapmin describe the process by which people come to participate in the rite. In order to take part in the Sunday service, people must come, as the Urapmin put it, "inside the Church." The inside/outside opposition is an important one for Urapmin Christianity. It is "inside the church," or as they sometimes say "inside God's fence" (like penned pigs prevented from destroying human gardens) or "inside the Christian life," that people are best able to maintain easy hearts and practice lawfulness. As soon as people "go outside" the church or "jump the fence" of Christian life, they enter a world in which it is very difficult not to sin. Once everyone has come inside, marking a first victory for lawful comportment, the service proper begins with a prayer, offered by someone nominated by the pastor.
These prayers inevitably include statements about human willfulness and the way it pushes people to sin and then describes the purpose of the church service as allowing people to receive God's word in their heart, so that they can become lawful. The opening prayer is followed by hymn singing and then a period given over to speeches by local politicians known as big men. These speeches often take up "outside" matters, such as disputes or the difficulties facing one or other major collective project, and the discussions they initiate are often marked by willfulness and anger. Thus they represent another expression of willfulness in the midst of the church service.
But once the speeches and the discussion around them are finished and someone has offered another prayer, the pastor begins his sermon. Sermons are at the center of Urapmin church services, and they mark the moment during the rite at which willfulness begins to be definitively overcome. As the prayer before the sermon is spoken, attention shifts to the pulpit at the front of the church -the part of the church most identified with lawfulness, for only those known to be free of recent willful sins can preach or sit as deacons on the raised platform upon which the pulpit resets. Like the opening prayer, Urapmin sermons always in one way or another dwell on the importance of lawfulness and the suppression of the will. More than this, they often explicitly address the way in which listening to the sermon in the correct manner itself counts as lawful behavior, while poor attention is itself willful. Here is an example of explicit preaching on this issue taken from a Sunday sermon:
You come inside and you look at each other, you look over to your friend, he looks back at his friend, you move your head around, turn your head from side to side. If you do that, if you are making noise, you won't be able to receive God's talk. God's talk will not be bound (get stuck) in your heart….Just come in quietly and sit down and whatever kind of man is giving talk or news, you think about it and you be peaceful. Then he [Jesus] will come and take you. You Christian people, you yourselves will get heaven, God's kingdom (Robbins 2004: 265-66 ).
Both in representational content and in the nature of its correct audition, then, the sermon portion of the service focuses on the value of lawfulness.
The sermon is sometimes followed by a period in which various members of the congregation "support" its message by reiterating what the pastor has said about the need for lawfulness and its link to salvation. Then, there comes a final prayer. This prayer is distinguished from all others in the service by the fact that after a prayer leader chosen by the pastor begins the prayer, everyone in the congregation prays loudly at the same time, creating a cacophonous roar of simultaneous voices that eventually fall away, leaving the prayer leader alone to conclude by naming each of the families in attendance and asking one by one that God bless them all. People then stand up and begin milling around the church and shaking hands, an important lawful gesture in Urapmin life generally (Robbins 2012b) . This final act of the rite can lost a long time, for each person is careful to shake the hand of everyone else in attendance. The mood during this time is notably "light" and relaxed -it has about it something of Durkheim's ritual effervescence.
The hand shaking has this effervescent quality, which the service mostly lacks until this point, because, I would suggest, this is the moment in the rite when lawfulness has finally come to full expression. It is when people realize the value of lawfulness in its fullest form as something they themselves are capable of realizing in their own performance. Indeed, I would extend this point by suggesting that Durkheimian effervescence is precisely what it feels like to realize a value fully-to realize something transcendent in its transcendent form, rather than in the piecemeal, often compromised forms in which ones realizes values, if one realizes them at all, in ordinary life. As it happens, Durkheim comes pretty close to making this argument himself and in doing so he takes up some issues not too far removed from those that concerned Marett in the works on ethics and religion that I mentioned at the outset. In order to consider how Durkheim does so, I turn to a short concluding section where the main issue I want to take up is how this foray into the transcendent realm as it appears through the window of religion might inform our consideration of ethics even in its ordinary, everyday forms.
Conclusion: Back to Ordinary Ethics
Just before Turner (1967: 30) (Durkheim 1974 , see also Karsenti 2012 for an important reading of this text). 5 It is here that Durkheim takes issue with Kant in a way that is crucial for our understanding of his approach to ethics. Against a Kantian emphasis on the demandingness of moral norms, he argues that moral ends cannot be merely a matter of duty or obligation, they must also be "desirable and desired" (45). If they were not desirable, Durkheim asserts, no one would act on them. A sense of duty alone is not enough to mobilize human action. The desirability of values, Durkheim goes on to suggest, is produced by experiences of the sacred, and therefore of society and of collective sentiments that transcend the individual. Soon we are in the territory of Durkheim's famous later argument about the ritual production of effervescence and its role in making society something people feel is greater than, even better than, themselves.
In this essay, though, the key point is that the socially derived power of the sacred makes values themselves, rather than society more generally, an object of desire. To this account of how the unusual, uplifting energy of collective sociality creates such desirability, I have added the suggestion that the ways ritual allows people to touch transcendent values in their fullest forms -to perform those values for themselves and see the shape of their complete realization -enables the desirability of single values to gain a hold on people that it can rarely manage to secure in everyday life.
But, and this is where I want to bring my argument to rest, even in the course of everyday life, some of the desirability of values that is produced in transcendent encounters with them must surely still be felt. 6 In the everyday, persons do not, for reasons we have discussed, often attempt to realize single value-linked desires fully. But the pushes and pulls different values exert give everyday life much of its sense of forward-movement, or at least of ethical potential. Although Das (2012: 138) holds out some hope of making habit central to everyday moral accomplishment, she, and even more so Lambek and Laidlaw (2014: 198-199 I also thank many of those in attendance at that meeting for their comments. Rupert Stasch, Maurice Bloch, and Jon Bialecki read early drafts and I think them, along with five very helpful anonymous JRAI reviewers, for their comments, while retaining all responsibility for the errors that remain.
1 As implied in the text, Lambek's references to ritual theory are only an apparent exception to this point. His interest is in Rappaport's performative theory of ritual, which in an essay that is a companion to the one I am discussing here he rightly relates immediately back to Austin and then to ordinary language philosophy (Lambek 2010b: 41) . Ritual, in the sense Lambek uses it in this context, then becomes a quality of "virtually all speaking" (48, see 54) and he does not attend to any qualities of ritual he identifies as specifically religious.
2 It is also possible to argue that everyday life has the qualities it often does because within it people strive to realize a value of interactional flow unbroken by various kinds of transactional disfluencies (see, e.g. the work of Garfinkel 1967) . The importance of this value for actors in everyday life encourages them to background various value conflicts that arise, settling for value compromises where in transcendent contexts they might not do so. If this analysis is correct, it indicates one way in which the everyday and ordinary themselves are not as effortlessly "immanent" and beyond values as they are sometimes represented.
3 Two of the reviewers of this paper raise the question of whether in this sentence and the one just above it I am implying that in any given social formation there will be a transcendent realm where the relationship between values is entirely coherent. I do not mean to suggest this. I have elsewhere discussed the fact that all religious traditions that I know of feature more than one kind of ritual and that often the different rituals in a tradition work to realize different values (Robbins 2014) . It is the transcendent modeling of single values, particularly in ritual, that I am concerned with here, not the ways relationships between different values are worked out in various social formations (an issue I take up in Robbins 2013) .
gone over in much greater detail elsewhere, though some of the analytic emphases are slightly different in this account (Robbins 2004: 255-268 ).
